Smart grid is a promising replacement for the traditional power grid. It uses two-way communication unlike traditional grid that has slightly changed since 20th century. This enables the smart grid to improve electricity generation, distribution, transmission, and consumption. In smart grid, the Utility Provider (UP) collects users power measurements' for two main reasons: billing and operation. Billing needs coarse-grained measurements where there are no, or minimal, privacy concerns. On the other hand, operation needs fine-grained measurements which can highly affect users' privacy. Hence, users might be reluctant to participate in operational metering to protect their privacy. To overcome this issue, UP might offer rewards to allure users to report their measurements which endangers their privacy. In this paper, we survey the literature on privacy-preserving metering in smart grid. We propose a new taxonomy to categorize the literature based on whether measurements need to be attributable to users or not. This categorization is highly effective because attribution is one of the main causes of privacy issues. Our survey shows that rewarding schemes and incentive-based demand response are new research topics with limited studies on it. Hence, we propose two privacy-preserving rewarding schemes for operational metering. First, a light-weight solution that utilizes an already established link of trust i.e. Banks. It is based on the assumption that banks will not leak a client account details. This solution is based on hash chains and blind signatures to assure users anonymity with minimal overhead for the UP and the smart meter. The bank in this approach is state-less in which is not required the bank to keep communications states of users and the UP. Second, we proposed another approach that does not rely on or banks or trusted third parties. It is based on Paillier homomorphic encryption and Pedersen commitments. It assumes that the smart meters are organized in a tree structure; which is widely used implementation in the literature. Security analysis for the proposed approaches is presented including unlinkability proof for measurements to users. The proposed approaches should enhance and facilitate users privacy in smart grid rewarding schemes. We provide some future research directions which includes further investigating different approaches to be used for operational metering in which it does not require the use of anonymity network, study the use of crypto currencies for rewarding schemes as it is an effective tool for microtransactions, and further efforts towards privacy-related standardization for smart grid.
I. Introduction

S
MART grid is a promising replacement for the traditional power grid. Traditional grid was slightly changed since 20th century. Smart grid improved its predecessor by using two-way communications unlike traditional grid which employed one-way communication. This enabled smart grid to improve electricity generation, distribution, transmission, and consumption by utilizing the detailed power measurements received from users. Advance metering infrastructure (AMI) is the facilitator for two-way communications in smart grid by using an integrated system of smart meters that aim to collect power measurements from users and send it back to the UP. This helps UPs to adjust power generation based on needs which in turn reduces power wastage.
UPs need to collect fine-grained measurements from users to maintain their operation. Some users might be reluctant to provide their measurements due to privacy issues.Hence, UPs might offer some rewards to allure users to provide their fine-grained measurements. However, this engenders numerous privacy issues because fine-grained
Corresponding author: S.Sultan Email: SariSultan@ieee.org. measurements allows for profiling users' activities. UPs might use another technique which aims to make users shape/reduce their power consumption using incentivebased demand response (IDR) (see section II-A for more details). IDR affects users privacy because they are required to submit fine-grained measurements. The challenge in rewarding schemes and IDR is that users have to submit attributable fine-grained measurements in order to get paid. This is a convoluted task because it trying to safeguard users privacy while providing attributable finegrained measurement to UPs.
Research on smart grid focuses on smart metering for billing and for operation purposes. Privacy issues in the former is considered minimal because users don't have to, usually, submit fine-grained measurements. Studies addressed billing under the assumption that UP needs attributable coarse-grained measurements (e.g., once a month) that don't highly affect users privacy. However, in smart metering for operation, utilities need to collect fine-grained measurements which is usually over smaller periods (e.g., 15 minutes) because it is far more important than coarse-grained measurements for operation maintainability (e.g., power generation and distribution). This is detrimental to users privacy. For example, fine-grained measurements can allow UPs to profile users daily routine (e.g., sleeping patterns) [1] . The second part that studies focus on is for operational uses. Most of the published studies in this area assume that submitted measurements do not need to be attributable to specific users in order for the UP to utilize it. However, rewarding schemes and IDR opens a new door for research under operational meters where it needs attributable fine-grained measurements in contrast to the conventional use of non-attributable measurements. Hence, most of the published research fails to provide a solution for this problem because it assumes that fine-grained measurements shouldn't be attributable. In fact, very limited studies addressed these issues [2, 3] .
In this paper, we survey the literature on privacypreserving schemes for billing, operation, and incentive based schemes. Data attribution or personal identifiable information (PII) are the major concerns when addressing privacy issues. Hence, we propose a new taxonomy to categorize studies based on whether the submitted power measurements are attributable or not. This helps the reader to notice the bird-eye view for research issues and solutions for privacy issues in smart grid metering. In addition, our survey showed that incentive-based schemes are relatively new topics with very limited studies published on it. Hence, we propose two schemes to address this issue, the first one relies on trusted third parties and the other one doesn't. In the first scheme, we propose an efficient solution that takes into account the smart meter capabilities. It utilizes an already established link of trust with banks. This allows us to use current national currency rather than introducing a new token's system. We assume that banks will not reveal users accounts information. Security analysis for this approach is presented with unlinkability proof to show that a UP cannot link fine-grained measurements to a specific user. In the second scheme, we propose a solution that does not require a trusted third party and relies on homomorphic encryption to preserve user's privacy. For this approach we assume that users have access to anonymity network; a widely used assumption based on the survey.
In this context, the main contributions of this paper are the following:
• Survey the literature on privacy-preserving metering schemes in smart grid.
• Propose a new taxonomy to categorize studies based on whether the submitted measurements need to be attributable or not.
• The proposed categorization should help readers to better understand the past, present, and the future of privacy-preserving metering in smart grid.
• Propose a lightweight privacy-preserving rewarding scheme for operational measurements based that relies on trusted third parties.
• Propose another privacy-preserving rewarding scheme for operational metering based homomorphic encryption and does not rely on trusted third parties. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the background material. Section IV presents the first part of our survey which addressed the attributable measurements. Section V presents the second part of our survey for non-attributable measurements. Section VI presents our two proposed solutions and the security analysis. Finally, section VII concludes this article and presents some future work.
II. Background
In this section we address some topics that would help readers to better understand the work presented in this paper. In Section II-A, we present brief details about load management in smart grid. Section II-B provides information on why privacy in smart grid is a pressing issue. In Section II-C, we address insider threats to show that single point of trust is not a suitable solution for smart grid.
We provide brief details on some cryptography primitives that are used widely in the literature and in this paper in Section II-D.
A. Load Management in Smart Grid
The bi-directional flow of data among utilities and users in smart grid enables better load management (LM). The term LM is used interchangeability in the literature with demand response (DR), and demand side management (DSM) [4, 5] . Basically, LM can be divided into two categories [6, 5] . First, price-based demand response (PDR) to motivate clients to change their consumption based on varying electricity tariff. Second, Incentive-based demand response (IDR) where clients are rewarded for reducing their consumption to match DR requests. IDR improves LM, however, it has some privacy concerns where in PDR users' privacy is less affected [5] . Hence, IDR poses serious threats to clients privacy [7, 5] . This is due to the fact that the measurement interval is short. For example MolinaMarkham et al. [8] showed that with short measurement interval (15 minutes or less) it can reveal the daily routine of customers, or even if a child is left alone at home. IDR is usually used for emergencies and special events, while for everyday PDR is used [5] .
For more details about load management, Goldman [6] presented a study about power efficiency and DR. Mahmood et al. [5] presented an overview of available techniques for load management in smart grid.
B. Why we need privacy-preserving smart metering Non-intrusive appliance load monitor (NALM) is a device that can determine the power consumption of appliances that is turning on and off. It does not require putting sensors on the appliances. It was developed to simply collect users power consumption measurements [9] . NALM, while used in the traditional grid, reveal detailed usage habits of customers in which it risks their privacy [9, 10] . In the smart grid, smart meters enable communicating fine-grained power consumption measurements to the UPs which will be more dangerous than the traditional grid.
For instance, Molina-Markham et al. [8] showed that it is possible to extract complex behavioral patterns from fine-grained measurements using available statistical tools. Behavioral patters can be very specific such as eating and sleeping routines. Measurements at hourly basis, or less, can reveal the religion of inhabitant. For example, Muslims do prayers five times a day at specific times, so specific usage patterns can be linked to users behaviors [1] .
Such profiling can be considered as a violation for legal rights. As Garcia and Jacobs [1] translated a report by the consumer organization in Netherlands that states, based on his translation, that frequent readings of smart meters violates article 8 of Privacy of the European Convention of Human Rights. In the same context, Quinn [10] presented a report about the privacy laws and concerns in smart grid within Colorado and at the federal level in the United Stated. The authors show that there are three pressing issues regarding privacy in smart grid. First, privacy issues are real in smart grid and should be addressed profoundly. Second, privacy invasion can create opposition to smart grid development. Third, communicated information in the smart grid is a very important factor that will affect the networking architecture and business models. The report concludes with the following remarks regarding the regulatory efforts. First, regulations should address consent for information disclosure with third parties. Second, protective measure should be in place and governed by regulations before accessing customer data. Third, third parties should inform customers in cases of data compromise or unauthorized access.
UPs and other entities are interested to map users behaviors in smart grid for numerous reasons. For example, the information collected can expose some users habits (e.g., watching TV), and hence, can be used for advertisement campaigns [11] . McDaniel and McLaughlin [11] recommended that in order to evade such security and privacy issues in smart grid there should be a national effort where governments establish rules for customers protection. For example, it is possible to develop a similar standard to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) but for the smart grid.
McDaniel and McLaughlin [11] also underscores the importance that government, academia, and industry should cooperate to solve this issue.
There are three main factors that are important to data privacy in smart grid [12] :
• Sampling Frequency: higher sampling frequency results in greater risk on users privacy. This is usually small for smart metering for billing and large for smart metering for operation.
• Attribution: this is important for billing. However, it is not very important for metering for operation. This introduces a new issue that customers sometimes are reluctant to give their personal information to the utility, which makes the utility offers rewards to allure customers to give their information. In such case, customers need to maintain their privacy while providing the information (attribution is important in this case).
• Exactness: How accurate is the information being sent.
C. Insider threats
Verizon data breach report of 2015 [13] , showed that and based on +100,000 reported incidents that the insider misuse was responsible for 20.6% of the attacks. In addition, a recent report by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), published in 2017, showed that for the last six years insiders threats were responsible for about 25% of total incidents [14] .
Garcia and Jacobs [1] mentioned that a downside for delegating trust to a single entity (e.g., UPs) the such trust may suddenly collapse. Hence, it is better not to use centralized trust and when developing a security approach for smart metering, user's information should be protected from UPs as well.
D. On cryptography primitives
In this section, we discuss some cryptography primitives that is widely used in this area. I Section II-D1 we discuss cryptography commitments. Homomorphic encryption, specifically Pailler cryptosytem, is discussed in Section II-D2.
1) Commitments
Commitments [15] allows users to commit a value without revealing it. Widely used types of commitments is Pedersen commitments [16] , which offers homomorphic features such as multiplying commitments to add their values or scaling a commitment parameters using exponentiation. Given a commitment C = Commit(x,r) it is hard to compute x or r. To open the commitment you need to have c,x,r and you check whether Open(C,x,r) is true. The commitment C must be bound to x and r, and it is hard to forge other values than the original x,r that can be used to open the commitment.
If we have G as a group of prime order p, agreed on generators g, h of G, and
where r is a chosen random value by the sender r ∈ Z p . We refer to this operation in later sections as Commit(x, r). The receiver cannot reveal the committed value x unless it has x and r. To verify, the receiver checks whether the received commitment C equals the generators raised to the power of revealed values x′ and r′ as C = ? g x′ .h r′ .
This allows homomorphic operations such as combining or scaling values. For example, to combine two commitments you need to multiply them as follows.
To scale the commitment C 1 by a factor k we use exponentiation as C
2) Hohomorphic Encryption and Paillier Cryptosystem
In this work we utilize additive homomorphic cryptography using Paillier cryptosystem [17, 18] . The system works as follows [19] . a) Key Generation: 1) Pick two large prime numbers p and q
) and n are co-prime i.e.
GCD(L(g
) is the public key, and (p, q) is the private key b) Encryption and Decryption: To encrypt a message m ∈ Z N , we select a random number r ∈ Z * N . Then,
To decrypt c ∈ Z * N 2 ., the message
modN . c) Homomorphic Additive Feature: Given two ciphertexts c 1 
III. Overview of Privacy-preserving Schemes for
Smart Grid Metering
A. Papers Selection Criteria
We surveyed a wide variety of papers that discussed containers security. Our selection criteria focused on papers that are published until January 2018. Most of the articles we found were published in 2010 to 2017. Our paper selection processes focused on materials from both the industry and the academia. We included papers from the proceedings of top academic research venues, tech reports, white papers, online articles.
B. Survey
We categorized the literature into two main categories based on whether the measurements have to be attributed to the user or not. This is because attribution is a major factor that affects privacy in the context of metering. Figure 1 shows an overview of the available techniques to achieve privacy-preserving metering in smart grid. In addition, table I shows a brief comparison on some studies in the literature. In the literature attributable measurements are usually used for two purposes: billing and incentive-based operational measurements. These techniques are further discussed in section IV. Regarding the non-attributable measurements, it is usually related to metering for operation purposes. This is further discussed in section V. [26] 2011 used a battery as well to achieve the effect for non-intrusive load leveling algorithm which aims to mask the appliance features that can be discovered by NALM (discussed earlier) the work is similar to [24] B&O S [27] 2011 Extended [24] work, by proposing "water-filling" algorithm, and they study the cost of using batteries in to protect users privacy. It also use batteries. Table End IV. Privacy for Attributable Measurements
In this section we will discuss the privacy issues that are related to submitting attributable measurements. Section IV-A will address submitting attributable measurements for billing purposes. In Section IV-B, we will address the other type in which users have to submit attributable measurements which is for a special type of operation metering called incentive-based.
A. Measurements for billing
This is usually considered a solved problem because users usually send coarse-grained measurements [33] , unlike metering for operation which requires fine-grained measurement. However, many researchers in this area address the issue that can rise from not using coarsegrained measurements. Such cases can be used for example if it had a non trusted SM environment where fine-grained measurements should be sent to UP. Most studies solved this by aggregating the fine-grained measurements outside the smart meter to create the bill. Solutions for this problem can be categorized into three main categories [33, 3] . First, via trusted third party (Section IV-A1). Second, using trusted platform modules (Section IV-A2 ). Third, using cryptography protocols without trusted third parties (Section IV-A3). However, we believe that the aforementioned first and third solutions are extraneous and can be avoided because it inherently assumes that the smart meter sends correct fine-grained measurements. Hence, the question here is why don't we let the smart meter aggregate the fine-grained measurements and calculate the bill (as in section IV-A2 ). We believe this would be suitable solution and more applicable for real word scenario.
1) via Trusted Third Party (TTP)
In this section will discuss two main approaches for using TTP in attributable billing. A fully trusted TTP approach that is discussed in Section IV-A1a and a semi-trusted approach is discussed in Section IV-A1b. a) Fully trusted: This is a simple solution for billing using TTP. All smart meters will send their fine-grained measurements to a TTP. The TTP will aggregate the fine-grained measurements for the specified billing period and submit the aggregated measurements to the UP. This represents the ultimate trust in the TTP and clearly it has many disadvantages. Such as exposing the user to the TTP in which it can profile the user. Although the TTP is considered trusted but as we discussed in Section II-C, insider threats must be taken into consideration.
In this approach both users and the UP fully trust the TTP for the following:
• Users trusts TTP for their fine-grained measurements • Users trusts that TTP will not collude with the UP and disclose their identity to the UP • Users and UP will trust that the TTP will accurately calculate the bill b) Semi Trusted: Some variations for TTP technique are proposed to decrease the level of trust in the TTP mostly using pseudonyms. For example, Bohli et al. [20] proposed two solutions (with and without TTP). They claim that the solution which uses TTP provides "perfect privacy" under certain conditions. The TTP receives the fine-grained measurements from the smart meters aggregate it and send the aggregated values to the UP enclosed with the user identity. Communication between the smart meter and TTP should be encrypted to prevent eavesdropping. To protect smart meters identities from the TTP, the authors proposed that each smart meter will agree on a pseudonym with the UP. The pseudonym will be associated with the fine-grained measurements instead of the real identity. In addition, the authors propose a privacy game to prove its security against malicious adversaries. The other solution that does not use TTP is discussed in section IV-A4 to maintain the document organization.
Petrlic [21] proposed to use TTP to anonymize finegrained measurements sent by the smart meter. A TTP will verify that the smart meter is authentic and removes any personal identifiable information then forward it to the operator. The author claims that by suing pseudonyms the UP will not be able to link it to a specific meter. We further investigated such claims in Section IV-A1b.
Effectiveness of pseudonyms Jawurek et al. [34] showed that the effectiveness of pseudonyms is doubted. They developed two attack vectors to target the privacy of pseudonyms. First, an attack to create a link between a smart meter real identity and its fine-grained measurements by linking behavior anomaly. Second, enable attacker to track origins of fine-grained measurements across different databases by linking behavioral pattern. They analyzed the attack on real consumption traces. Results proved the feasibility of the attacks in practice. They concluded using pseudonyms in not sufficient to maintenance users privacy and provide unlinkability.
2) Trusted Platform Modules Some researchers used trusted platform modules (TPM) within the smart meters. The basic idea here is to let the smart meter calculate the bill and send it to the UP. TPM is used to assure that the calculation is performed correctly in a trusted platform. This is widely used assumption in the literature in addition to assuming that the smart meter is tamper-proof device. However, a trusted TPM by the UP doesn't necessarily guarantee users' privacy because users must trust who installed the TPM (usually UP) will make it operate correctly. This leads to TTP issue again to answer the following questions. Do users trust who installed the TPM? Do users trust the third party who verified that TPM works correctly?
LeMay et al. [35] is the first to integrate TPMs and virtualization into smart grid to preserve confidentiality, integrity, availability, and users privacy. The authors proposed an architecture called attested meters for AMI and provided threat analysis for their prototype. Petrlic [21] proposed a twofold technique using TPMs in order get signed tariffs from the UP and calculate an authentic bill.
It also uses pseudonyms given by a TTP to protect users privacy for fine-grained measurements submitted to maintain the operation (not billing). Hence, The techniques are used for billing and operation. However, as discussed earlier in section IV-A1b, there are some downsides for using pseudonyms. Vaughan-Nichols [36] and Oppliger and Rytz [37] discussed the trust worthiness of TPM, and showed that the effectiveness of such approaches is debatable.
3) Cryptographic Protocols Homomorphic encryption is predominant in this area of work [12] . The main differences among studies are: who aggregates the data, and how keys are managed. Based on [12] analysis, this type of aggregation assumes that smart meters complexity is high which is a major downside due to the unpretentious nature of smart meters resources.
Garcia and Jacobs [1] suggest replacing universal trust assumptions with other trusted components and make smart meters enjoy certain level of autonomy. The authors developed a technique using homomorphic encryption (Pailler encryption) and secret sharing.The protocol requires O(n 2 ) bytes of interaction between smart meters. Some other researchers refer to this scheme as inefficient [38] . Kursawe et al. [39] proposed different protocols for aggregating smart meters measurements that are based on Diffie-Hellman and Bilinear-map.
Dimitriou and Awad [32] proposed two protocols to securely aggregate data in smart grid without TTP. The first one is based on symmetric key cryptography. However, it relies on the premise that at least one trusted neighbor exists, and pre-shared keys are installed on the trusted neighbors set, which can be hard to achieve in a real world scenario. The second one is based on public key cryptography.
Danezis et al. [30] proposed a privacy-friendly protocol that addressed many issues in smart grid billing. It aims to perform functions on encrypted measurements using secret sharing methods.Ács and Castelluccia [40] proposed a protocol that does not rely on a trusted third party that is based on homomorphic encryption. The proposed method requires the customers to add some noise to their usage while the UP can obtain the sum of usages with high probability. However, the sum of measurements have to be exact because it affects the bill price. Their work does not include time-varying billing rates. a) Commitments & Zero-knowledge proofs: In this area, smart meters are widely used to calculate the bill from fine-grained measurements and send the bill to the UP along with a proof that the smart meter calculated it correctly. To perform billing using commitments the smart meter creates commitments for each fine-grained measurement x i ∈ X, where X is the total reported measurement. This x i will be committed with random number r i ∈ R, where R is a set that contains random numbers for each x i . The commitment will be C i = (x i , r i ). Each commitment will be signed by the smart meter and sent to the UP.
In return, the UP verifies that it is an authentic smart meter by checking the signature on the commitment, then sends pack the tariff for that time period t i . The smart meter multiplies each measurement x i with the tariff of that period t i to get its billing price p i . To eliminate the randomness added to the commitment, the smart meter will calculate the price for the random number as p ri = p i * r i . The smart meter send the total price of X and R to the UP. The UP checks the correctness of calculation by using the homomorphic feature of the commitments: exponentiating the tariff with each commitment received. This helps in protecting the users' privacy in which only the total price for the bill is known (not fine-grained readings). Following is an example to show how it works.
Assume a smart meter that wants to calculate a bill of three fine-grained readings (for simplicity) that is measured every 15 minute, starting at 10:00AM. First, the smart meter will calculate the first reading on 10:15 AM, x 1 . Then will generate a random number r 1 . Afterward, it will create the commitment C 1 = Commit(x 1 , r 1 ). Then the smart meter will send C 1 to the UP (no anonymity network needed). Where K SM is a shared key with the UP.
SM → U P : {C 1 (x 1 , p 1 )}K SM Afterward, the UP will check if the smart meter is an authentic one based on its signature and send the tariff for that time period t 1 . And saves the commitment c 1 . The smart meter will do the same steps for the other two reading x 2 , x 3 . And at 10:45, the user will have three readings, random numbers, and tariffs. The user will compute the bill price: P = (x 1 * t 1 ) + (x 2 * t 2 ) + (x 3 * t 3 ) And will also calculate the price for the random numbers:
P R = (r 1 * t 1 ) + (r 2 * t 2 ) + (r 3 * t 3 ) Now to report the bill the user send P and P R to the UP. In order for the UP to check the correctness of the measurements it will use the homomorphic feature of scaling a commitment as follows.
The UP will calculate a scaled commitment for each one. For example, for C 1 = Commit(x 1 , r 1 ) it will raise it to t 1 to get:
The, will multiply them together to get:
Which equals C P +P R = Commit(P, P R ). The UP previously received P and P R , so now it will verify it that the commitment opens as Open(C P +P R , P, P R ) ≡ ? true. We should note that this simple method works only for simple tariffs that need to be multiplied with the consumption. Jawurek et al. [22] proposed a similar technique to the illustrated above. It is used only for billing purposes, hence, it will not be suitable for submitting fine-grained measurements that is usually used for operation purposes. It does not require a TTP. However, it requires a TPM chip that is capable of doing commitment operations using Pedersen commitments [16] . This technique assumes a fixed tariff.
Molina-Markham et al. [8] proposed a protocol that is used for billing which uses zero-knowledge proofs. This allows the UP to verify that the bill is valid without revealing any fine-grained measurements. This technique assumes a fixed tariff. Rial and Danezis [25] proposed a protocol that is used for billing based on zero-knowledge proofs and Pedersen commitments. It allows complex tariff ( instead of fixed tariff as in [8, 22] ). The protocol cannot be used for aggregation cross meters.
4) Other Techniques
Bohli et al. [20] proposed two solution, one based on TTP (discussed in section IV-A1). The other aims to release the aggregated value with random noise chosen from a particular distribution with zero expectation. However, drawbacks for this approach is that individual measurements are not encrypted which leads to the necessity that the added noise should be large enough to protect privacy [40] .
B. Incentive-Based Metering
Users might be reluctant to share their information and utilities might allure them with rewards to give up their information. This adds extra level of complexity where utilities needs to verify the correctness of the information received and be able to pay the users back while preserving their privacy. Hence, the techniques used to preserve privacy for fine-grained measurements (discussed in section V will not work, because it assumes that finegrained measurements does not have to be attributable. In details, anonymity via aggregation will not be suitable solution because utilities won't be able to pay the user back. In addition, anonymity via TTP would add an extra complexity to the system and extra guarantees needs to be in place to assure no collusion would happens between the TTP and the UP. Finally, aggregation without TTP assumes a complex smart meter that can perform complex cryptographic operation. However, smart meters have unpretentious capabilities, and thus such techniques would be hard to implement in real word scenario.
Simply put, incentive-based metering aims to provide the users with incentives either to provide fine-grained measurements that is required by the UPs to maintain their operations, or to shape their usage. Following we will discuss incentive-based demand response in Section IV-B1 and rewarding schemes in Section IV-B2. 1) Incentive-based Demand Response a) Using Cryptography: Gong et al. [3] proposed the first work in this area. In which they introduced a solution that allows linking fine-grained measurements to users to enable receiving incentives. The solution is based on zeroknowledge proofs, identity-committable signatures, and partially blind signatures. It relies on a trusted third party (the demand response provider). In addition, it requires an anonymity network to send the measurements.
2) Rewarding Schemes a) Using Cryptography: Dimitriou and Karame [2] proposed a system for rewarding that does not rely on a TTPs. The proposed solution is built based on hash chains, blind signatures, and partially blind signatures. A good thing about the proposed technique is that it does not require the smart meter to authenticate its measurements every time, which is a computational intensive process using digital signatures. It uses hash chains in which the smart meter can authenticate N measurements with only one signature operation (using blind signature). This reduces the computation on the smart meter side. The proposed system does not leak information about the identity of the users even when they redeem the rewards. However, it relies on a new tokens systems which means a new infrastructure should be built to accommodate rewards redemption. The tokens are proven to fight again double spending and forgery. In addition, users cannot be paid with national currency. It also assumes a complex smart meter structure which is costly, and usually smart meters have limited resources. The proposed scheme assumed trusted (e.g., tamper-proof) smart meters and the use of anonymity network.
V. Privacy for non-attributable measurements
In the literature, this type of measurements are related to maintaining the UP's operation. It assumes that the submitted measurements do not need to be attributed to a specific smart meter and measurements are made at small frequencies (e.g., 15 minutes or less).
A. Metering for operation
Smart metering for operation where utility needs to collect usage information to maintain the smart grid operation (e.g., power generation adjustments). This is usually needed for smaller time periods compared to billing periods.
1) With aggregation
Were two or more smart meters need to aggregate their fine-grained measurements before sending it to the UP. a) via Trusted Third Party: Bohli et al. [20] proposed technique can also be used for operation (for billing purposes is discussed in IV-A1b). The idea is based on a TTP that aggregates fine-grained measurements of multiple smart meters before sending it to the UP. This allows the UP to maintain operations while protecting users' privacy because UP only receives aggregated data.
Kim et al. [28] used a TTP to aggregate numerous smart meters readings that is obfuscated. It is hard to retrieve original reading from the obfuscated ones. The aggregated fine-grained measurements are sent to the UP.
Similarly, Vetter et al. [41] used homomorphic encryption with a TPP. In which the TTP is responsible for keys management. The TTP sends homomorphic keys to the smart meters which is used to encrypt their measurements and put it in a shared central storage. The UP can request a combined key, and sum of measurements (additive feature of homomorphism) for a group of measurements that will decrypt the combined measurements retrieved from the central storage.
b) Using Cryptography Protocols: The most used tools here is homomorphic encryption, in which a group of smart meters aggregate their measurements (using simple addition), then submit the measurements and aggregated key. Li et al. [19] proposed homomorphic encryption approach in which a smart meter will forward its fine-grained measurements (encrypted using homomorphic encryption) to other smart meters which in turn will perform aggregation on the received data. The meters will be arranged in a tree structure with a root node as the tree collector. The proposed approach assumes honest-but-curious smart meters. Marmol et al. [29] claims that it is not a valid assumption for realistic scenarios and proposed a solution that addressed malicious meters behavior.
2) Without aggregation Were no two or more smart meters need to aggregate their fine-grained measurements before sending it to the UP. a) via Trusted Third Party: Efthymiou and Kalogridis [23] proposed a method using pseudonyms to submit measurements based on its frequency as follows. First, low frequency which is attributable data the is used usually for billing. This data will not affect the user privacy because it has a long period. Second, high frequency data that is used usually for operation and this do not need to be attributable to the user. The proposed solution uses a trusted third party to remove PII from high frequency data. However, this puts great level of trust in the trusted third party.
Paverd et al. [42] analyzed this protocol (proposed in [23] ) and claim that the UP can link the high frequency submission to the user identity which violates the unlinkability requirement. However, if the pseudonyms are changed frequently it would provide unlikability to their proposed protocol. b) Without Trusted Third Party: A. Anonymity Network Finster and Baumgart [31] proposed a solution using pseudonyms to submit fine-grained measurements that does not need to be attributable to the user which allows the UPs to maintain operations. The approach uses blind signatures for authentication phase. However, actual reporting is sent using an anonymity network to protect users privacy. Regarding the low frequency data it is still submitted with the user real identity for billing.
B. Using Battery Kalogridis et al. [24] proposed "Best-Effort" algorithm that uses rechargeable battery to hide the smart meter fine-grained measurements. The battery changes the consumption data to help to protect users privacy. This allows users to control the degree the level of shared information with the UP. However, the challenges for introducing a battery were not evaluated. Similarly, McLaughlin et al.
[26] used a battery to achieve the effect for non-intrusive load leveling algorithm which aims to mask the appliance features that can be discovered by NALM similar to the study presented in [24] .
Kalogridis et al. [27] extends their work in [24] (the "Best-Effort" algorithm) by proposing "Water-filling" algorithm, to answer some unresolved issues in their previous work such as studying the cost of using batteries. It aims to study the cost of using batteries. The cost of using rechargeable battery can be a limiting factor of such approach. They propose a privacy-preserving algorithm to reduce private information exposure by the UP.
VI. Proposed Solution for Rewarding Schemes
The proposed solution, based on our taxonomy, will aim to solve the issue with attribution for fine-grained measurements in rewarding schemes as shown in figure 1 . Section VI-A presents the model and notation. In Section VI-B we present our first solution that uses a trusted third party. The Second solution is presented in Section VI-C.
A. Model and Notation
We assume that UP want to collect information about tasks T ={t 1 , ..., t n } from a set of users U={u 1 , ..., u m }. We assume that each task has the same reward amount. A central bank (B) will act an intermediary to deliver the readings required by the users M={m 1 , ..., m n }. Each user should be able to participate with task delivery, be able to send readings to the UP, and get paid without leaking any information about themselves. In addition, B should not be able to learn any information about the measurements provided by the user. Regarding the connection, we assume users have access to the Internet. We assume that each user has already established a bank account with B and knows the public keys of B and UP. Each user has a smart meter that is pre-loaded with its public key pair K s , K −1 s that are tamper-proof.
The system should allow users to provide attributable fine-grained measurements, while preserving their privacy. UP give rewards to the users who are willing to participate. We also assume that national currency should be used for rewarding users and pay for bills (No tokens are used or crypto currencies).
1) Threat Model
We assume an adversary Eve that has full control of the network (but cannot target availability). We also assume an honest-but-curious UP in which it will forward the payment to the bank, but will try to link the fine-grained measurements to a specific smart meter. In addition, we assume that the smart meters can anonymity network to submit measurements to the UP. Eve main goal is to link measurements reported by users to their identity. Eve can be any intermediary device (e.g., a router controlled by ISP) or the UP. We assume bank will not provide bank details (salted hash) to the UP in which it is linked to the user identity. Our goal is to allow the smart meter to submit attributable-measurements and get paid from the UP without degrading its privacy.
B. Proposed Solution using Stateless bank
In this approach the bank does not need to keep any state of the transactions. We assume the following to establish this approach. A User has a bank account (Acc), the bank can identify the bank account with its hash value:
Where H(.) is a secure hash function. This value is only known to the bank and the user. In addition, we assume that anonymity network is used to send finegrained measurements to the UP. Figure 2 shows the proposed stateless approach. We adopt a similar approach proposed by [2] where the user first creates a hash chain A = {A 1 , A 2 , . .., A n } then asks the utility to blind sign the last hash A n (step 1). The utility will verify that the user is an authentic user and if yes it will blindly sign it (step 2). The user can then get the signed value of A n by multiplying the received blindly signed signature σ * with b −1 to get σ. This allows the user to submit up-to n measurements without signing each one every time which will save computations.
(Step 3) the user will send the measurements along with the signature and the secured account information SM ACT using anonymity network. The account details will be used to accumulate the payments for multiple measurements. After the hash chain is exhausted (or upon user request), the UP will issue the payment to the user account (step 4).
1) Security Analysis a) Linkability Analysis: In this section we prove that although the hash chain parameters A i ∈ A n sent in clear text during the reporting phase the utility or Eve provides will not be able to link different submission to a smart meter. However, the UP will be able to link fine-grained measurements together in order to pay the user in a way that does not reveal users' identity nor affect their privacy.
A. Authentication Phase Assume a smart meter S that has an RSA key pair
s . UP has RSA the key pair (e, N ), (d, p, q). The steps for authentication using blind signature and hash chains is as follows. 
1) S chooses random number
R s , sets A 0 ← R s . 2) Compute hash chain such that ∀i ∈ [1, ..., n] ∃A i = H i (A 0 ). 3) Blind A n ≡ H n (A 0 ) by computing. A * ← b e .A n ,
B. Reporting Phase
We assumed S sends reporting via anonymity network, were communication cannot leak the identity of S to UP. S creates measurement M . Then append it with unused authorization credential A j where j ∈ [1, ..., n] . This means that S will send for the first message A n . As follows:
Now UP can decrypt the message because it is encrypted with his public key and can extract A n . (Even if S sends the signature of A n it will be the same: by raising it to the public key). From this the UP can know the value of A n and can link it to the secured account information SM ACT . In the next section we will show that if we have two smart meters the UP cannot discover the identity of the smart meter using the information it knows.
C. Unlinkability Proof Suppose we have two smart meters S1, S2 are authenticated to the UP as in the authentication phase discussed earlier.
For S1. The UP has the following information A * In the reporting phase assume the server received A n1 . Until now the server cannot map it to any of the users. Now the goal is to map A n1 to one of the smart meters:
Step 1: Calculate the signature of the received value
Step 2: Find Sig
Step 3: Now multiply each of σ * 1 and σ * 2 with the inverse signature obtained in Step 2 As follows:
Step 4: Calculate the inverse of the obtained values [Raised to the power e] 2 and 3 from (step 3) using the extended euclidean algorithm as follows: For σ * 2
Step 5: Multiply each of A * 1 and A * 2 with the inverses obtained in (step 4) and check if the result is equal to the received A n , if yes then the server can link the sent value to the user as follows:
This will be Linked to S 1 This means that A n1 is linked to S 1 and S 2 . This means that the values sent in clear will always generate a correct map to all the smart meters.
Thus, the proposed approach protect smart meters privacy.
b) Advantages: The proposed solution has the following advantages
• Using already established link of trust, assuming users and UP have bank account. Which is a reasonable assumption.
• The bank will not keep any states • The bank will not learn anything about the finegrained measurements • The fine-grained measurements cannot be linked to the user by the UP (unless the bank exposed user account details, but it is a reasonable assumption that the bank will not).
• The proposed solution is easy to implement using current technology infrastructure (e.g., PKI) c) Disadvantages: • We assume that reporting phase communication are performed using anonymity network, which might introduce a new level of trust in the anonymity network or proxy. However, based on the literature most of the published research for attributable fine-grained measurements used similar assumption. Addressing alternatives to this approach is considered for future work.
• There are no guarantees that the bank will send the payment (step 4)
C. Proposed Solution Without TTP
UP seeks fine-grained measurements to maintain its operation. These measurements are not needed to be perdevice and can be an aggregate on numerous devices (e.g., a neighborhood) [19] . Hence, in this approach we aggregate numerous smart meters fine-grained measurement and send it to the UP while permitting the users will be able to get paid for the submitted measurements. We use similar approach proposed by Li et al. [19] by constructing a tree for each neighborhood and aggregate the fine grained measurements using Paillier Homomorphic encryption (discussed in section II-D2). The main difference is that Li et al. [19] scheme does not provide authenticity for the submitted measurement, hence it will not be suitable for rewarding schemes because UP will not be able to pay the users. Our proposed approach solves this issues and works as follows.
1) Setup Phase
In this phase, the UP creates a tree of N smart meters (typically a neighborhood). The head of this tree will be the UP itself acting as a collector. Figure 3 shows a tree constructed by the UP for 6 smart meters that will be used by this scheme.
2) Reporting Phase: part 1 To report the data, each smart meter collects the aggregated measurements from its children, then calculate its aggregation output by multiplying its own encrypted finegrained measurements with the aggregate value collected from its children (if any). Figure 4 shows an example for the 6 smart meters. For instance, if smart meter 5 want to make the aggregate it will first collect the encrypted measurements from its children (node 1 and 2 i.e. C O1 and C O2 ) then multiply the aggregate with its own encrypted fine-grained measurements which will calculate
For the UP (i.e. collector), to decrypt the aggregated measurement it will first calculate the total aggregate C total as
Then, the decryption of C total will be 3) Reporting Phase: part 2 From the previous section the UP can get the total aggregate as discussed without mapping it for a specific smart meter. However, this will not work for rewarding scheme because the UP cannot authenticate the measurement to a smart meter. Hence, this step comes as an extension to the previous section to allow the smart meter to get paid for the submitted measurement. The use primitive here is Pederesen commitments (discussed in section II-D1).
Each smart meter along with the homorophically encrypted fine-grained measurement C n , will submit also a commitment K to its fine-grained measurements. Thus, smart meter 1 will send to its parent C O1 = EM 1 and a commitment K O1 = K(M 1, r1) (where r1 is a random number). Hence, the total submitted measurements will be as shown in Figure 5 .
For the UP, it will decrypt the homomorphic aggregation of the measurements (as in equation 5 ). However, for the commitments UP will need to collect the aggregated commitments as follows:
, r1 + r2 + r3 + r4 + r5 + r6
A g g r e g a t io n P a t h C total = C O5 · C O6 Fig. 4 : Aggregation tree in reporting phase: part 1: fine-grained measurement is encrypted with Paillier homomorphic encryption and sent to the parent node.
A gg re ga ti on P at h < C total , K total = K O5 · K O6 > Fig. 5 : Aggregation tree in reporting phase: part 2: it included the homomorphically encrypted fine-grained measurements (from figure 4 ) and a commitment (K) to each smart meter submission also homomorphically aggregated with Pedersen commitments
4) Rewarding Phase
In order for the UP to verify the aggregated commitment (in equation 6), it will need the following information:
has this piece of information (from equation 5) 2)
∑ N i=1 r i , UP does not have this piece of information Hence, for the UP to get the aggregate of the total number, each of the smart meter will send its r value to the UP using secure link.
D. Security Analysis
In this section we show the unlikability among users measurements and their identities. We will use figure 5 as an example to illustrate the unlinkability. It is assumed that each smart meter in the protocol and UP are honebut-curious entities, which means that they will follow the protocol steps but will try to link fine-grained measurements to each user (invading privacy). a) Linkability among smart meters: For smart meter (1) when it sends its fine-grained measurement to smart meter (5) through secure link C O1 . Smart meter (5) will not be able to read the measurements because it is encrypted with the UP public key. Hence, only UP can decrypt it. Furthermore, the random number g ( see section II-D2), prevents smart meter (5) from performing a dictionary attack, because it will randomize the measurements. Regarding the commitment send from smart meter (1) to (5) i.e. K O1 . This will not reveal also any information about the fine-grained measurements because to open the commitment user (5) needs both the measurements and the random number r 1 (in which smart meter (5) have none). It will also prevent dictionary attacks for the same reason.
This shows that users cannot reveal fine-grained measurements from each other at the lowest level of the tree. Furthermore, for higher levels in the tree, it will be even harder to extract information from the smart meters submission because it will be aggregated measurements rather than one measurement only.
b) Linkability by UP: Regarding the aggregated measurements, the UP will not be able to link it to a specific smart meter because it is homomorphically aggregated, so there is infinite number of possibilities for each user to submit. Regarding the aggregated commitment. Users reveal their individual random number (e.g., smart meter (1) reveal r 1 ). This will not also leak details about the fine-grained measurements of the users because the UP will aggregate these random numbers in order to reveal the aggregated commitment (not individual commitment). This shows that UP also cannot link fine-grained measurement to a specific smart meter.
VII. Conclusion & Future Work
In smart grid, the Utility Provider (UP) collects users power measurements' for two main reasons: billing and operation. Billing needs coarse-grained measurements where there are no, or minimal, privacy concerns. Operation needs fine-grained measurements which can highly affect users' privacy. Hence, users might be reluctant to participate in operational metering to protect their privacy. To overcome this issue, UP might offer rewards to allure users to report their measurements; which endangers their privacy. In this paper, we present a survey on the privacypreserving metering schemes in smart grid. We categorize the research based on if the measurements needs to be attributable or not, which gives new insights about this research area. We further propose two new technique to protect users privacy in rewarding schemes for operational metering. We analyze the security and unlinkability of the new approaches.
For Future work, we still need to study the computational performance of the proposed approaches. In addition, we need to analyze the best approach for billing, and is it really better to aggregate the measurement inside the smart meter or send the fine-grained measurement to be aggregate outside.
